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1. Introduction 
1. Deforestation and forest degradation are among the most important single sources of 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), contributing about 20 percent of total emissions 
annually, not to speak of the associated losses of livelihoods, biodiversity, environmental 
services, and cultural patrimony. To address this problem, efforts are underway to develop 
systems of payments for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Developing Countries (REDD). The Parties to the UNFCCC agreed in December 2007 in Bali to 
explore policies and financial incentives that could be implemented to encourage REDD after 
2012.  
2. As these negotiations get underway, the World Bank has launched the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) to build capacity and provide financial incentives for REDD. The 
FCPF will help up to 37 countries to achieve the following goals: (i) establish a national 
reference scenario for emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, based on 
historical and projected emissions; (ii) adopt a national REDD strategy based on their current 
forest and environmental legislation; and (iii) adopt a national system for monitoring, 
reporting, and verifying emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.  
3. As countries embark on ambitious programs for REDD, they need information on the 
future costs and benefits of these programs. REDD payments will make many efforts to avoid 
deforestation attractive, but not all. The costs of some programs to reduce deforestation will 
exceed the benefits, despite the expected payments for REDD. Two key variables to 
determine the profitability of a REDD program will be the costs associated with the program 
and the payment per ton of emission reduction. 
4. A number of studies have attempted to estimate the aggregate cost to the global 
economy of reducing emissions from deforestation. The Stern Review estimated the cost of 
avoiding deforestation entirely in eight countries collectively responsible for 70 percent of 
land use emissions at between US$1 to 2/tCO2 (Stern, 2007, based on Grieg-Gran, 2006). 
Kindermann and others (2008) estimate that halving emissions from deforestation between 
2005 and 2030, corresponding to a reduction in emissions of 1.7 to 2.5 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide (tCO2), would require financial flows of US$17 to 28 billion per year to the developing 
countries responsible for these emission reductions. This would amount to a payment of 
US$10-21/tCO2. A 10 percent reduction over the same period would cost between US$0.4 and 
1.7 billion annually and US$2-5/tCO2. These numbers were derived using three global models 
assessing the opportunity costs of reducing deforestation. 
5. Individual countries considering participating in a REDD mechanism, however, need 
information on what it would cost them to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, and how to actually deliver those emissions reductions. Estimates of global 
average costs provide very little guidance in this regard, as in addition to the inevitable crude 
approximations that must be made in any such large-scale exercise, conditions within any 
given country may well differ substantially from the average. 
6. This paper aims to do two things. First, it tries to clarify some very important 
conceptual issues. What exactly are we asking when we ask what the ‘cost’ of REDD is? What 
kinds of costs should be included? Second, it tries to highlight some of the issues involved in 
properly estimating the costs of REDD. Such estimates would help them to assess issues such 
as (i) how many emission reductions they might potentially be able to ‘sell’ to a REDD 
mechanism at given prices; (ii) how much the country would benefit from such sales; (iii) how 
they might be able to actually reduce deforestation so as to generate these emissions 
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reductions; (iv) how the costs and benefits of REDD would be distributed among different 
groups within the country; (v) what the budgetary implications would be for government 
agencies.  
7. Estimating the costs of REDD is one thing; actually delivering those emission reductions 
is another. The two cannot be wholly separated, as part of the cost of generating emission 
reductions from REDD is the cost of the actions needed to actually avoid deforestation 
(‘implementation costs’). This note does not attempt to indicate how to successfully avoid 
deforestation, but does show how a properly conducted analysis of the country-level costs of 
REDD can provide very important inputs into the development of such policies. 
8. For a country, the benefit of participating in REDD would arise from the difference 
between the payments it receives for the emissions reductions resulting from REDD, and its 
costs of achieving it. Many governments are hoping to use REDD as a source of revenues to 
finance sustainable development. It is precisely from the difference between the costs of 
REDD and the compensation that countries receive for it that such financing may be 
generated. Whereas the amount and form of payments remains to be decided, the costs of 
avoiding deforestation depends largely on conditions within the country, and thus can be 
estimated even without knowing precisely how a REDD program will operate. Under either a 
market-based approach to REDD or a fund-based approach to REDD, countries need to know 
how much it would cost them to deliver emissions reductions.  
9. We should make clear from the outset that there is no single numerical answer to the 
question of what the cost of REDD is for a country. Because agro-ecological, economic, and 
social conditions can differ substantially from place to place within a country, the costs of 
REDD can likewise differ substantially from place to place. Likewise, the cost and 
effectiveness of measures to reduce deforestation will vary. The results of the analysis of the 
costs of REDD will thus consist of a range of costs applicable to different situations or areas. It 
is quite likely that every country will find that there are many areas in which REDD would not 
be justified by any realistic payment per ton of emission reduction. Conversely, it is very 
likely that every country will find that it has many areas in which even quite modest 
payments for avoided emissions would render efforts to avoid deforestation attractive. The 
real issue is not whether REDD payments would be attractive at all, but how many emission 
reductions a country would find it attractive to provide at any given price per tCO2 reduced.  
2. What do we mean by costs? 
10. In this section, we aim to clarify what is meant by the ‘costs of REDD.’ We begin by 
discussing the different categories of costs, and then examine who would bear what costs.  
2.1 Categories of costs 
11. Consider a hectare of forest. This forest sequesters a certain quantity of carbon. 
Cutting down the forest and converting the land it stands on to agriculture or pasture would 
release much of this carbon into the atmosphere, thus contributing to global climate change. 
It would also damage the biodiversity that the forest contains, perhaps cause other problems 
such as affecting downstream water flows, and deprive local people of traditional sources of 
livelihoods and access to ancestral grounds. 
12. Opportunity costs. Deforestation, for all its negative impacts, can also bring benefits. 
Timber can be used for construction, and cleared land can be used for crops or as pasture. 
Reducing deforestation means foregoing these benefits. Similarly, forest degradation because 
of selective logging, fuelwood collection, or grazing of animals also brings benefits, and 
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avoiding this degradation foregoes these benefits. The cost of foregone benefits is known as 
“opportunity costs” and is usually the single most important category of costs a country would 
incur if it reduced its rate of forest loss to secure REDD payments. Estimating these 
opportunity costs is thus the central problem in estimating the costs of REDD. Estimating 
opportunity costs is also critical to understanding the causes of deforestation. Most economic 
agents do not cut down forests out of malice—they do so because they expect to benefit from 
it. Estimating the magnitude of opportunity costs gives a fair estimate of the pressures for 
deforestation. Understanding how opportunity costs are distributed across groups within 
society tells us who would gain and would lose from REDD, which is important both from a 
moral/ethical perspective (if losses would be borne by vulnerable groups) and from a 
practical one (if losses would be borne by politically powerful groups able to prevent adoption 
of REDD policies or resist their implementation). Estimates of the opportunity costs thus 
provide inputs not only into the costs the country would bear from REDD, but also into the 
causes and distributional implications of deforestation and, hence, the types of interventions 
needed to actually reduce deforestation and the potential need for mechanisms to avoid 
adverse social consequences. 
13. Implementation costs. In addition to opportunity costs, there are also costs involved 
in implementing a REDD program. These are the costs directly associated with the actions 
leading to reduced deforestation, and hence to reduced emissions—for example, the cost of 
guarding a forest to prevent illegal logging, of relocating timber harvesting activities away 
from natural forests to degraded land scheduled for reforestation, of intensifying agriculture 
or cattle ranching so that less forest land is necessary for food production, of re-routing a 
road project so that less forest land is destroyed as a result of opening the road, of relocating 
a hydroelectric production project away from a natural forest, of delineating and/or titling 
land to traditional and indigenous communities so that they have an incentive to keep 
protecting the forest against conversion, and so on. All of these measures incur investment 
and recurring costs for the public and/or the private sectors, which need to be assessed and 
financed. Implementation costs also comprise the institution- and capacity-building activities 
that are necessary to make the REDD programs happen (including the expenses associated 
with the goods, training, research, and the political, legal and regulatory processes involved, 
including the consultations and government decision-making processes). These may be 
difficult to estimate, but they ought to be recognized.1  
14. Transaction costs. Over and above opportunity costs and implementation costs, REDD 
also involves specific transaction costs, which are the costs that are necessary for the parties 
to a transaction involving a REDD payment (the buyer and seller, or donor and recipient), as 
well as external parties such as a market regulator or payment system administrator, to 
establish that the REDD program has indeed achieved a certain amount of emission 
reductions. The costs are incurred in the process of identifying the REDD program, negotiating 
the transaction, and monitoring, reporting, and verifying the tons of emission reductions. 
They are incurred by the implementers of the REDD program and third parties such as 
verifiers, certifiers, and lawyers. These costs are separate from implementation costs, as by 
themselves they do not reduce deforestation or forest degradation. They are nevertheless 
                                                
1  Some governments have indicated a desire to use REDD as a source of revenues for financing more 
than forest protection in their countries. REDD is seen by some as an opportunity to finance 
sustainable development. This is a laudable goal, but does not imply that such sustainable 
development actions should be considered a cost of REDD; on the contrary, they are a benefit of 
REDD. 
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necessary to the transparency and credibility of the REDD program and thus add value to the 
whole process.  
15. Boucher’s (2008) review of 29 regional empirical estimates found mean opportunity 
costs of US$2.51/tCO2, with 18 out of the 29 estimates at less than US$2/tCO2, and 28 out of 
29 at less than US$10/tCO2. The mean opportunity costs for Africa was US$2.22/tCO2, that for 
the Americas US$2.37/tCO2, and that for Asia US$2.90/tCO2.2 Boucher estimates average costs 
of implementation and transaction costs together as being on the order of US$1/tCO2, or 
about 20 percent of opportunity costs. Grieg-Gran (2006) estimates implementation and 
transaction costs as reaching between 5 and 20 percent of the costs of avoiding deforestation 
in the countries with most forest cover.3 Using a highest-altyernative value approach (see 
below), the opportunity costs of REDD in Guyana are estimated at US$2 to US$11/tCO2e 
(Republic of Guyana, 2008). Thus opportunity costs seem to be the largest cost component of 
REDD in many cases. This will not necessarily be true in all cases, however.4  
2.2 Accounting stance 
16. Any discussion of costs must immediately address a critical question: costs to whom? 
Here a very important distinction must be made between (i) costs to the country, (ii) costs 
to individual actors, and (iii) budgetary costs to government agencies.5 Each of these 
categories of costs is very important in its own right, but they are very different. 
Inappropriately mixing different categories of costs is an easy and common mistake, and can 
result in very misleading estimates of costs. The perspective from which costs are calculated 
is known as the accounting stance. 
17. Cost to the country. The costs to the country as a whole include any costs that are 
perceived anywhere within the country, net of any benefits that are received anywhere 
within the country, omitting any costs and benefits that accrue outside the country. This is 
the perspective of a benevolent social planner seeking to maximize welfare within the 
country. Several important aspects of this perspective need to be emphasized: 
 Any transfer from one party within the country to another is not a cost to the 
country. A payment made by the government to forest owners, for example, would 
be accounted as a cost to the government but as a benefit to the forest owner, and 
so would cancel out in the accounting from the country’s perspective. The 
administrative costs of making the payment, however, would remain a cost for the 
country, as they would be an expense for the government but would not be 
received by the forest owners.  
 Benefits or costs that accrue outside the country are not included in the country’s 
accounts. This includes the climate change mitigation benefits of carbon 
                                                
2  It should be noted, however, that Boucher found these differences across the continents not to be 
statistically significant 
3  Using Grieg-Gran’s ‘realistic’ scenario. Her estimated administrative costs would be 8-33 percent 
of her most conservative cost estimate, and 4-16 percent of her highest cost estimate. 
4  This is trivially true, of course, in cases where there are no opportunity costs; see section 3.1 
below.  
5  The costs to the country are sometimes known as “economic” costs (Gittinger, 1982) or “social” 
costs (Monke and Pearson, 1989), while costs to individual actors are sometimes known as 
“financial” costs (Gittinger, 1982) or “private” costs (Monke and Pearson, 1989). We avoid these 
terms as they can easily lead to confusion. The term “social costs”, for example, is often used to 
refer to non-economic impacts on society.  
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sequestration, as well as any biodiversity conservation the benefits of which are 
received primarily outside the country.6 
18. Costs to individual groups. Individual groups within the country are likely to receive 
only part of the costs and benefits of any given land use. Indeed, a major reason for 
deforestation is that land users often perceive just a small part of all forest benefits, but 
stand to receive a large part of the benefits generated by alternative land uses. Opportunity 
costs often look very different from the perspective of individual groups and from that of the 
country as a whole. Individual groups only consider the specific subset of costs and benefits 
that are received by the land users. In general, such groups will not bear much of the costs of 
implementation or of the transaction costs involved in a REDD program.7  
19. Budgetary costs to the government. The government itself is of course a particularly 
important individual actor within the country. Government agencies attempting to implement 
programs to reduce deforestations face costs to do so. The government will usually bear little 
or none of the opportunity costs, but it will often bear the bulk of the costs of 
implementation (although there can be important exceptions depending on how REDD 
programs are implemented) and of the transaction costs.  
20. In general, the main difference between the different accounting stances is which 
costs and benefits are included. The country’s perspective includes all costs and benefits that 
accrue within the country, while the perspectives of individual groups and of the government 
only include those specific costs and benefits that these groups perceive. The other major 
difference is that under the country’s perspective, costs and benefits should also be valued at 
the social value of resources (their value in their next-best alternative use) rather than at 
their observed market prices. The social value of a resource may differ from that observed in 
markets either because of policy distortions (taxes, subsidies, import restrictions, and so on), 
or because of market imperfections. Conversely, costs to individual groups are valued at the 
prices that these groups actually pay, including any taxes. The difference between social 
values and observed market values was once very significant, as governments used to 
systematically distort the prices of agricultural inputs and outputs. As a result of reform 
processes, these distortions are now much smaller, though by no means non-existent. The 
discount rate used to assess costs to the country should be the social discount rate normally 
used by the government. In contrast, the discount rate used to assess the costs and benefits 
to individual group should reflect their rate of time preference. If the costs to all individual 
groups (including the government) were added up and re-calculated based on social value of 
resources rather than observed prices, they should equal the costs to the country. 
21. Properly estimating the costs as seen from the perspectives of different users is vital 
for several reasons. First, it is important if costs are to be estimated appropriately. As noted, 
many costs and benefits received by individual groups may not be costs to the country, in that 
one group’s costs are another group’s benefits. This is particularly true of many kinds of 
government budgetary expenditures. Second, understanding the distribution of costs and 
benefits is extremely helpful in understanding incentives to cut down or degrade forests. A 
                                                
6  It is precisely for this reason that countries have very limited incentives to reduce emissions or 
conserve biodiversity, barring outside compensation through mechanisms such as REDD. 
7  There can be exceptions, of course. For example, land users participating in Costa Rica’s program 
of payments for environmental services must pay for the preparation of a management plan, to 
fence and signpost areas under conservation contract, and for independent forest engineers to 
monitor their compliance (Pagiola, 2008). Thus some of the program’s implementation and 
transaction costs are passed on to them. 
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group that would bear high opportunity costs from REDD is very unlikely to protect forests 
voluntarily. They must therefore either be compelled to do so or compensated for doing so. 
The distribution of opportunity costs thus provides important guidance on the formulation of 
policies to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. Third, the distribution of costs and 
benefits is important in its own right, as many stakeholders in forest issues are poor or 
vulnerable groups.   
3. Estimating the costs of REDD 
22. In this section, we discuss in more detail some of the issues that arise in estimating 
the costs of REDD. The basic building blocks of the cost analysis are estimates of returns to 
forest and to alternative land uses, and of their respective carbon stocks.8 The difference 
between the returns to forest and those to the land use that would replace it indicates the 
opportunity cost of maintaining forests, while the differences in carbon stocks indicates the 
avoided emissions from doing so. This comparison will vary from area to area, depending on 
the nature of the forest, the agronomic suitability to different alternatives, the distance from 
markets, and many other factors, and thus must be conducted separately in different areas. 
The process thus involves three main steps: 
 Identifying and mapping the forest areas at risk of being deforested or degraded, 
and the land uses which are most likely to replace them. 
 Estimating the returns to both forest areas and alternative land uses, and the 
carbon stock under each (as well as other benefits, to the extent possible), so as to 
estimate the opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation or forest degradation.  
 Using these data together to make projections of opportunity costs and carbon 
emissions reductions under alternative scenarios. 
Note that efforts to estimate implementation costs are part of the third step; they rely on a 
prior estimation of opportunity costs, which would identify areas in which REDD would bring 
the highest benefits (because of low opportunity costs).  
3.1 Opportunity costs 
23. Preserving forests means foregoing the benefits that would have been generated by 
the alternative land uses that would have replaced the forests. If forests are cleared for 
agriculture, for example, then preserving forests means foregoing the benefits of crop 
production. The difference between the benefits provided by the forest and those that would 
have been provided by the alternative use is the opportunity cost of avoiding deforestation. 
24. In general, the forests of interest to a REDD debate have on-site benefits that are 
lower than the potential benefits of alternative land uses. Forests that have high on-site 
benefits are generally not at risk of deforestation or degradation. Almost always, therefore, 
the opportunity costs of REDD programs will be positive.  
25. The one notable exception may occur when forests are free-access resources. In that 
case, even very high on-site benefits might not save forests from degradation or destruction, 
because individual users have no incentive to protect the forests. Saving such forests would 
                                                
8  The discussion below applies to both deforestation and forest degradation, if ‘degraded forest’ is 
considered as a distinct alternative land use. Indeed, one could define several types of ‘degraded 
forest’, with different levels of degradation. We thus speak simply of the choice between forest 
and alternative land uses, rather than constantly repeating ‘deforestation and forest degradation.’ 
  8 
not, therefore, incur opportunity costs – indeed, it might generate net benefits to the 
country. In this case, the cost of reducing deforestation or degradation would consist solely of 
the cost of the measures necessary to change the free access nature of the forest. 
26. Note also that many efforts to save forests act by increasing the benefits generated by 
forests. For example, eco-certification schemes attempt to generate a price premium for 
timber from sustainably managed forests. If these efforts are successful (without depending 
on on-going subsidies, trade protection, or other market distortions), they would convert 
positive opportunity costs to negative ones. In this case, as well, the cost of reducing 
deforestation would be limited to the cost of implementing the measures necessary to 
increase the on-site benefits of forests. On the other hand, an on-going subsidy to forest 
products (or a trade distortion that drives up the domestic prices of forest products) would 
not eliminate the opportunity costs – only hide them.  
27. Net vs gross values. It is common to only consider gross values – for example, the 
value of crops that could be produced on land cleared from forest. This would tend to greatly 
overstate opportunity costs, however, as well as giving a mistaken impression of deforestation 
pressures. Producing crops, or livestock, or indeed any other economic activity, involves costs 
– for labor, for inputs, for working capital. What matters, then, is not the gross revenue that 
an activity might generate, but rather its net benefit.  
28. Change in values. It is important to keep in mind that the opportunity costs of REDD 
are not given by the value of the benefits foregone from the alternative land use, but by the 
difference in net benefits between forest and the alternative land use. Forests can often 
generate a variety of benefits such as provision of fuelwood and other non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) (Lampietti and Dixon, 1995; Bishop, 1999). In some cases, these benefits can 
be quite sizeable. If deforestation or forest degradation is reduced, at least part of these 
benefits would continue to be enjoyed. The proper measure of opportunity cost, then, is how 
much less benefit would be obtained by not switching to the alternative land use.  
29. Actual vs potential opportunity costs. In computing opportunity costs, there are two 
possible approaches:  
 Looking at actual land-use changes based on historic trends. These are not 
necessarily the highest-value land use changes.  
 Estimating the highest-value alternative land uses. The report prepared by 
McKinsey for Guyana's president on the opportunity cots of deforestation uses this 
approach, for example (Republic of Guyana, 2008).9  
The second method gives higher estimates of opportunity costs in per hectare terms, but not 
necessarily in per ton CO2 terms because the loss of carbon may be higher than in an actual 
land use approach. If there are barriers to adopting the highest-value alternative uses, 
however, estimates based on the highest-value alternative use may bear little resemblance to 
the opportunity costs that countries actually face.  
30. One relatively simple method of determining opportunity costs is to estimate the 
benefits generated by forests in an area, and comparing them to the benefits generated by 
                                                
9  The highest-value alternative approach, as used in the report prepared by McKinsey, gives an upper 
bound on the opportunity costs that a country would face. In most countries this upper limit is only 
theoretical, however—actual deforestation is typically to land uses that are much lower value 
(particularly if changes in co-benefits are included), and that would be a better measure of what 
the country is actually giving up.  
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non-forest lands in that same area. This approach has several problems, however. In 
particular, the land still under forest may not be comparable to the land that has already 
been converted to other uses. Farmers will first seek to convert the land that has the best 
soils, the most favorable topography, and is most accessible. Observed returns to land that 
has been converted to agriculture is thus likely to over-estimate the likely returns that land 
still under forest would generate if it were also to be converted to forest. This approach also 
only provides a static picture of opportunity costs, making it difficult to predict how they 
might evolve over time.  
31. A more sophisticated approach involves developing models of returns to different 
activities, based on parameters such as yields, input use, and prices. These models could be 
relatively simple or relatively sophisticated, depending on data availability and analytical 
capacity.  
 The simplest approach would be to use production budgets for the different land 
uses which break down in detail all the inputs and outputs, with quantities and 
prices for each.10 By varying these values appropriately, estimates can be made of 
likely returns under different conditions. Areas with poorer soils, for example, 
would have lower yields, and hence lower returns – or higher costs, if additional 
fertilizer is used to compensate for the poorer soils. Areas further from the road 
would face higher transport costs. 
 If data allow, a production function or profit function could be estimated 
econometrically.  
32. Spatial detail. Opportunity costs are likely to vary substantially from place to place, 
depending on both agroecological conditions (for example, soil type, slope, and climate) and 
socioeconomic conditions (for example, distance to markets, availability of labor, and clarity 
of tenure rights). Average values may thus be very misleading. Efforts should thus be made to 
obtain opportunity cost estimates at the highest level of spatial detail possible. Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) provide a valuable tool to organize available information and 
undertake the analysis. 
33. Variation over time. In many cases, opportunity costs may vary over time. Land 
cleared from forest may initially be very productive, for example, but become gradually less 
productive until it is either left fallow to regenerate, abandoned, or switched to another use. 
In other cases, the alternative to forest may be a use with a particular time profile, such as a 
tree crop that only become productive several years after planting. Even if yields remain 
unchanged, their value may change over time as input and output prices change. These 
variations cannot always be predicted, but sometimes they can. Road construction or 
improvement, for example, can have substantial impacts on both input and output prices. 
Nepstad and others (2007), for example, project how planned road improvements in the 
Amazon will affect the profitability of different land uses and hence the opportunity costs of 
avoiding deforestation. In all such cases, a single snapshot view of costs and benefits would 
be misleading. Rather, the present value of the projected flow of costs and benefits should be 
estimated. 
34. Multipliers. The economic impact of an activity can be wider than their returns 
indicate. Some activities can induce further economic activities through their effect on 
demand. If this impact were to be substantially different for forest to non-forest activities, 
then the estimate of opportunity cost should be adjusted accordingly. The range of estimated 
                                                
10  Richards and Stokes (2004) call this the ‘bottom-up engineering approach’. 
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short-term multipliers is wide, ranging from 0.1 to 3.1, but most expenditure multipliers are 
in the range 0.6 to 1.4 (Hemming and others, 2002). These apply to government spending, 
however, rather than to individual economic activities. 
3.2 Converting to per ton of carbon 
35. Opportunity costs are generally estimated on a per hectare basis, as this is the form 
that data on returns from land uses are available in. To convert the opportunity cost of 
reduced deforestation per hectare into a cost per ton of carbon, information is also needed 
on the difference in carbon density between the forest and the alternative land use.11  
Figure 1: Computing the costs of REDD 
 
36. Figure 1 illustrates the computation of the costs of REDD. In this example, avoiding the 
loss of 1 ha of forest prevents 250tC from being emitted, but the alternative land use has a 
stock of 20tC, so the net emissions avoided are 230 tC.12 Maintaining forest foregoes $30/yr in 
income from pasture. Given the $10/yr that forests provide, the opportunity cost is $20/yr. 
Because this land must be maintained under forest for a long time, this annual opportunity 
cost must be converted to present value terms. Using a 30 year time horizon and a 10 percent 
discount rate, this gives a cost of $209/ha. This is the value of the income foregone by 
maintaining forest on this land for this time period. To convert this opportunity cost in per 
hectare terms to one per ton of carbon terms, we divide by the net emissions reduction, in 
this case 230tC, and obtain $0.91/tC or, equivalently, $0.25/tCO2e. This is the opportunity 
cost of REDD in this example. To arrive at the full costs of REDD from the country’s 
                                                
11  It is not known whether REDD will require that estimates of this difference include changes in soil 
carbon; this may be elective, as it is for afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM. 
12  If some of the timber harvested when forests are cut down is used for furniture or other long-
lasting uses, the carbon it contains would not be emitted. Having to account for the fate of timber 
would add significant complexity to the calculations, however, and is unlikely to be required in a 
REDD program. 
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perspective, implementation and transaction costs must be added. If the implementation 
costs came to $0.10/tCO2e and the transaction costs to $0.05/tCO2e, then the country would 
be better of if it were paid any amount over $0.40/tCO2e to avoid deforestation. Individual 
land users would need to receive a compensation of at least $20/yr to voluntarily forgo 
deforestation.  
37. Note that here, too, what matters is how carbon density changes. Basing the 
conversion on the entire carbon stock of the forest would assume that it is all entirely lost 
upon deforestation. However, non-forest land uses can often sequester some amount of 
carbon, so using the entire stock would overestimate the actual reductions in emissions and 
underestimate the cost of achieving them. In the example above, if the carbon stock 
sequestered in pasture is ignored, the apparent avoided emissions would be 250tC/ha, and 
the unit cost of achieving it would appear to be $0.84/tC instead of $0.91/tC, or 8 percent 
less. The greater the carbon stock in the alternative land use, the greater the 
underestimation. If forests were replaced with agroforestry with about 100tC/ha, for 
example, the actual net emissions reduction would be 150tC/ha, at a unit cost of $1.39tC, so 
basing estimates on gross carbon losses would underestimate the cost by almost 40 percent.13 
38. Figure 2 shows examples of carbon density measurements for selected land uses at 
three sites studied by the ASB program. As can be seen, while forests hold substantially more 
carbon than alternative land uses at those sites, some alternatives can hold non-negligible 
amounts of carbon. Because carbon levels can vary over time in a given land use, these data 
are shown in terms of time-averaged carbon stocks. The ASB protocols for measuring carbon 
stocks and computing time-averaged carbon stocks are described by Woomer and Palm 
(1998). As a first approximation, the ASB program provides the following rules of thumb for 
carbon stocks in the humid tropics (Swallow and others, 2007): 
 Natural forests contain about 250 tC/ha, and accumulate about 2.5 tC/ha/yr with 
a mean residence time of 100 years. 
 Agroforests contain about 90-120 tC/ha, and accumulate about 3 tC/ha/yr with a 
mean residence time of 20-40 years. 
 Fastwood plantations contain about 50 tC/ha, and accumulate about 5 tC/ha/yr 
with a mean residence time of 10 years. 
                                                
13  Properly accounting for changes in carbon stocks also affects the relative cost of avoided 
deforestation and avoided forest degradation. The opportunity costs of avoiding forest degradation 
are likely to be considerably lower than those of avoided deforestation. Because the avoided 
carbon stock change is so much smaller, however, it does not follow that avoided degradation is 
necessarily cheaper in per tCO2e terms. 
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Figure 2: Time-averaged carbon densities for selected land uses 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data in Palm and others (2004). 
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39. A direct comparison between the carbon stocks of forest and an alternative land use 
becomes more difficult when their stocks vary over time. Consider the example of a standing 
forest that is cut down and replaced with an agroforest. Conversion would release the bulk of 
the carbon stock that the forest had contained but then, as indicated by the ASB data above, 
carbon stocks would gradually rebuild, eventually reaching as much as half the original level. 
In this case, the level of avoided emissions, and hence the cost per ton of emissions avoided, 
depends on how the comparison is made. Richards and Stokes (2004) find that previous 
estimates have used three main methods: (i) the ‘flow summation’ method, which sum the 
total tons of carbon captured over a given time horizon, regardless of when capture takes 
place; (ii) the ‘average storage’ method, which uses average carbon stored over one full 
management rotation14; and (iii) the ‘levelization/discounting’ method, which applies a 
discount rate to carbon sequestered at different times. As they demonstrate, these three 
methods can give very different results. We do not yet know how a REDD program would 
account for differences in carbon stocks over time. 
3.3 Moving to the national scale 
40. To obtain an estimate of the national costs of REDD, the estimated costs in any given 
area must be aggregated up, and combined with estimates from other areas. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The opportunity cost analysis is repeated for every relevant area 
threatened by deforestation, taking into account the various alternative uses to which 
converted forest land is put. In this example, deforestation affects two areas: area A, where 
40,000 ha/yr are converted to pasture and 20,000 ha/yr are converted to agroforestry, and 
area B, where 20,000 ha/yr are converted to soybeans. The top part of the figure shows the 
net emissions in each case, and the net benefits that would be generated. Avoiding this 
deforestation would avoid these emissions, but forgo these benefits. The middle part of the 
figure converts the per hectare emissions and opportunity costs into per ton carbon terms (as 
in the previous example) and then computes total potential emissions reductions and costs. 
Thus halting all conversion of forest to pasture in area A would avoid 9.2 million tC of 
emissions, at a total opportunity cost of $8.3 million, while halting the conversion of forest to 
soybeans in area B would avoid 5.8 million tC of emissions at a total cost of $14.6 million. It is 
interesting to note that in this example, avoiding conversion to agroforestry is not much less 
costly in terms of cost per ton of carbon than avoiding conversion to soybeans, even though 
soybeans generates much higher returns per hectare. This is because agroforestry has 
relatively high carbon stocks, which partially offsets the difference in per hectare opportunity 
costs.  
41. The bottom part of the figure then uses this information to trace out the country’s 
supply curve for REDD. It shows that the country could supply up to 18 million tC of REDD. If 
the country were offered a payment of, say, $1.50/tC, it would only make sense for it to 
attempt to avoid conversion of forest to pasture in area A, where the opportunity cost is 
$0.91/tC. If it succeeded in halting this deforestation, it would receive payments of $14 
million and face opportunity costs of $8 million, leaving it about $6 million better off 
(although some of this will be used to pay for implementation and transaction costs). If this 
deforestation was only reduced by half, on the other hand, both the benefit and the cost 
would be halved. Similarly, a payment of $2.5/tC would induce the country to seek to halt all 
deforestation in area A, whether for conversion to pasture or agroforestry, but not to halt 
deforestation for soybean production in area B. By halting all deforestation in area B, the 
                                                
14  ASB calls this method ‘time-averaging’ (Woomer and Palm, 1998; Palm and others, 1999). 
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country would receive $31 million and bear costs of $15 million, leaving it over $15 million 
better off (although, again, some of this would have to pay for implementation costs). 
Figure 3: Deriving a national supply curve for REDD 
 
 
42. Of course, implementation and transaction costs must still be added to these 
opportunity costs. But the supply curve as it stands can already provide considerable 
guidance. If the REDD payment offered were of $2.60/tC, for example, it would seem unlikely 
that seeking to avoid conversion of forest to soybeans in area B would be attractive for the 
country. Even though the payment exceeds the opportunity cost of $2.5/tC, it does not do so 
by much, making it likely that implementation costs will drive total costs above the payment. 
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Even if implementation costs were very low, there would be little net benefit to the country 
from making this effort. In fact, this supply curve can be used to determine the maximum 
implementation and transaction cost that would make efforts to reduce deforestation in an 
area attractive, for any given price of REDD. This supply curve can thus help prioritize 
national efforts to reduce deforestation, by identifying areas in which such efforts are most 
likely to bring net benefits to the country. 
3.4 Co-benefits 
43. In principle, the country’s perspective should include all costs and benefits generated 
by a given land use that are perceived within the country. This would, in principle, include all 
on-site benefits (such as fuelwood and timber collection, recreation, and so on) as well as all 
off-site benefits (such as protection of water services, landscape benefits, and so on), except 
those that are received primarily outside its borders (such as carbon sequestration and 
biodiversity conservation). In practice, it has been common in the REDD debate to consider 
the on-site benefits separately from the other benefits, dubbed “co-benefits”, of preserving 
forests. We follow this convention here.  
44. When the co-benefits of forests are high, the costs of REDD from the country’s 
perspective fall, and might in fact become negative. Consider a forest generating $10/ha/yr 
in on-site benefits, and which would generate $150/ha/yr if converted to cropland. The 
opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation in this area appear very high, at $140/ha/yr. 
Suppose, however, that cutting down this forest would cause $200/ha/yr in downstream 
damages such as sedimentation of reservoirs, or increased flood damage. Preserving the 
forest would avoid these damages. If the value of these co-benefits were to be included, the 
actual opportunity cost to the country would be negative: -$60/ha/yr.15 In this case, it would 
be in the country’s interest to seek to avoid such deforestation even in the absence of any 
REDD payment.16 Omitting the value of co-benefits thus makes opportunity costs appear to be 
higher than they are. 
45. In general, the value of co-benefits is very difficult to estimate and even more 
difficult to convert to per hectare terms, so they cannot usually be incorporated explicitly in 
opportunity cost estimates. It is, however, often feasible to identify areas or conditions under 
which co-benefits are likely to be particularly high. Pagiola and others (2006), for example, 
identify areas within highland Guatemala that are particularly important for water supplies, 
and prioritize them. Such information can then be used in conjunction with opportunity cost 
estimates to determine whether particular areas should be included in a REDD program. An 
area with high opportunity costs would generally not be attractive for inclusion in a REDD 
program, but if the co-benefits are likely to be high, this conclusion might be changed. In the 
example in Figure 3, a proposed payment of $2.5/tC would not have been sufficient to induce 
efforts to avoid deforestation in area B. But if part of the area that is threatened by 
conversion to soybean production were known to be in an important water supply area, such 
efforts might be justified—though perhaps targeted solely to the water supply area, rather 
than to all of area B.  
                                                
15  Plantinga and Wu (2003), for example, find that the erosion and water pollution co-benefits of an 
afforestation program in Wisconsin (USA), would by themselves be sufficient to justify its costs. 
While this result cannot be generalized, it shows that in some cases co-benefits can be quite large. 
16  An important issue that will need to be resolved is whether avoiding deforestation in areas where 
co-benefits are sufficiently high to offset all opportunity costs would be considered to meet a REDD 
additionality criterion. Given the difficulty of measuring co-benefits, it may not be practicable in 
many cases to exclude such areas from eligibility for REDD. 
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3.4 Implementation costs 
46. Actually reducing deforestation or forest degradation usually requires expending effort 
and resources. Most of the costs of implementation are likely to be budgetary costs for the 
government. Some costs, however, are likely to also be borne by others. Not all of these 
costs, however, are costs to the country. In particular, any transfer payments that 
compensate individual landholders for their opportunity costs are not a cost to the country.  
Figure 4: Cost of REDD achieved using a payment mechanism 
 
47. An example will illustrate (Figure 4). Suppose, as in our original example, that a 
landholder currently gains $10/ha/year from forest and would gain $30/ha/year from 
converting this forest to pasture. Thus the opportunity cost of preserving a hectare of forest 
is $20. Now suppose that the government institutes a program of payments for environmental 
services (PES) and offers payments of $40/ha/year to landholders who conserve their forests, 
and suppose further that administering the PES program costs the government $5/ha/year. 
Our landholder would find the payment attractive and enroll in the program, even if it 
imposes costs of, say, $4/ha/year (for example, to fence off the enrolled area). In this case, 
the budgetary cost to the government will clearly be $45/ha/year: that is what the 
government will spend. However, the cost of implementation to the country will actually be 
only $9, or the sum of the actual costs that the program imposes on the government ($5) and 
the participant ($4). The $40 payment itself is not a cost to the country: while it is a cost to 
the government, it is a benefit to the landholder, so that the two cancel out. The $5 in 
government administrative costs, on the other hand, is properly considered a cost of 
implementation. But any costs imposed on participants, such as the $4 in fencing costs of this 
example, are also costs of implementation, even though they do not appear on the 
government’s books. In this example, the landholder is better off by $16/ha, as the payment 
offered exceeds their opportunity cost ($20) plus the implementation costs they face ($4). In 
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the national accounting of costs and benefits, the cost of this $16 to the government is 
exactly offset by the benefit to the participant. The total cost of REDD to the country of 
achieving reduced deforestation in this way would thus be $29/ha/year (opportunity costs 
plus implementation costs), which is equivalent to $0.36/tCO2e. Figure 5 revises the national 
supply curve for REDD derived previously to incorporate the estimated implementation costs 
of a $40/ha/yr PES program. Note that this program would not succeed in avoiding  
conversions of forest to soybeans in Area B, as the payment offered is insufficient to offset 
the $70/ha/yr opportunity cost that farmers face. Another approach, or a higher PES 
payment, would be needed to avoid deforestation in this area. 
Figure 5: Adding implementation costs to national supply curve for REDD 
 
48. Effectiveness of implementation. It is important to understand how effective a given 
measure will be at reducing deforestation. Ineffective measures would result in very 
expensive emission reductions, as their cost would be spread over only a few avoided 
emissions. Pfaff and others (2008), for example, estimate that Costa Rica’s PES program has 
only reduced deforestation by about 1 percent. Conversely, Tattenbach and others (2006) 
estimate that PSA reduced deforestation by about 50 percent.  
49. In the example above, suppose that there are ten participants in the PES program, 
each with 10 ha enrolled. Also suppose that five of these participants would have conserved 
forests even in the absence of the PES program, as in their case the benefits of conversion to 
pasture are less than the benefits that forests generate, for instance due to poor soils or long 
distance from roads. In other words, making payments to these five participants does not 
increase the amount of forest that would have been conserved: there is no additionality. 
Assume that the five others face opportunity costs of $20/ha/year, as before. For these five 
participants, payments do result in additional conservation. For these five participants, the 
cost of implementation is $9 as before, and the opportunity cost is $20/ha/year, as before, 
giving a total social cost of reducing deforestation of $29/ha/year. For the five participants 
that would have conserved forests anyway, there is obviously no opportunity cost. There is, 
however, a cost of implementation, as resources must still be devoted to signing contracts, 
monitoring compliance, making payments, and so on, while participants must also expend 
resources to comply with contract provisions such as fencing the enrolled areas. Thus the cost 
to the country of enrolling these five participants is $9/ha/year. The total cost to the country 
of the program is therefore $1900/year ($29/ha/year over 50 ha and $9/ha/year over 50 ha). 
Because this program covers 100 ha but is only avoiding deforestation on 50 ha, its average 
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cost to the country per hectare of REDD is $38/ha/year ($0.47/tCO2e), or about 30 percent 
more expensive than a program that was able to target only land users who would have in 
fact cut down their forest. Similarly, the budgetary cost per hectare of REDD is $110/ha/yr 
(=55x10/5), or double the $55/ha/yr (=55x5/5) of a perfectly targeted payment program. 
50. Leakage. Leakage would result in a similar reduction of efficiency. The displacement 
of deforestation from one area covered by the incentive payment to another area not covered 
by the payment must be taken into account when calculating the average cost of the 
program. Suppose for example that in the example above, two of the five participants with 
positive opportunity costs all clear an additional 10 ha elsewhere to replace the 10 ha of 
forest they have each enrolled in the PES program. In this case, the net deforestation 
reduction induced by the program is only 30 ha. The total cost to the country per hectare of 
REDD would be $50/ha/yr ($0.62/tCO2e) because costs of implementation would now be 
spread over only 30 ha. 
51. Implementation costs are not necessarily correlated with opportunity costs. For 
example, opportunity costs are likely to be quite low in forest frontier areas where farmers 
are cutting down free-access forest areas for subsistence farming, but the implementation 
costs of resolving the problem by establishing and enforcing clear property rights in such area 
can be quite high. Conversely, the implementation costs of a PES program implemented in an 
area of large farms producing commercial crops would be quite low thanks to easy 
accessibility, but opportunity costs would be quite high. Implementation costs will also not 
necessarily decline as the scale of implementation grows (unlike transaction costs, see 
below). On the contrary, it seems reasonable to expect that there would be diminishing 
returns to additional efforts to reduce deforestation, with some deforestation being quite 
easy to avoid, but then costs rising as additional reductions are sought. 
3.5 Transaction costs 
52. In addition to the opportunity costs and implementation costs of avoiding 
deforestation, countries will also have to bear transaction costs to document to buyers and 
REDD regulators that emissions reductions have been achieved. There is, at present, little 
data on how large these costs might be. Antinori and Sathaye (2007) find mean transaction 
costs of US$0.38/tCO2e in a sample of project-based CDM forestry projects.17 A nationwide 
approach would likely have substantially lower average transaction costs, however. Indeed, 
Antinori and Sathaye find strong economies of scale in their sample of CDM projects. 
Likewise, Wunder and others (2008) find that national-scale PES programs tend to have lower 
transaction costs than watershed-scale programs. 
53. An important aspect of transaction is they are likely to be largely fixed rather than 
variable. Their weight in the total costs of REDD, when expressed in $/tCO2e, will thus 
depend on how successfully the country reduces deforestation. The greater the reduction in 
deforestation, the greater the amount of emissions reductions over which these fixed costs 
will be spread, and the lower transaction costs will be in $/tCO2e terms.  
4. Conclusions 
54. The type of analysis discussed in this paper is meant to provide information to 
countries in developing their REDD programs: in determining what it would actually cost them 
to supply emissions reductions by reducing their national rates of deforestation and forest 
                                                
17  These are not REDD projects, however. 
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degradation. It is in the country’s interest to carry out this analysis as accurately and 
objectively as possible. Overestimating the costs of providing emissions reductions would 
make reducing deforestation appear less attractive and result in a country undertaking a less 
ambitious REDD program than it might have. The country would thus be leaving money on the 
table, as well as missing out on any co-benefits that would have been generated by avoiding 
deforestation. Conversely, underestimating the costs of providing emissions reductions would 
make avoiding deforestation appear more attractive, and would result in the country 
providing at least some emissions reductions at a loss. 
55. As part of their undertakings under the FCPF’s Readiness Mechanism, developing 
countries should undertake their own analysis of the costs of REDD. This work is part of the 
process of adopting a national REDD strategy or adding to the existing set of laws and 
regulations to arrive at a legal and institutional framework for REDD. Economic rationale is 
one factor (not of course the only one) that should guide decision making. A country should 
know how much it costs to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation so it is 
better prepared to decide how much to invest in which emission reduction program, and also 
to negotiate payments for REDD. 
56. For the purposes of the FCPF, it is proposed that an independent Technical Advisory 
Panel will be set up to advise on the methodologies to be followed to estimate the costs of 
REDD, and then to encourage countries to apply this or these methodologies to underpin their 
national REDD strategy adoption process. The FCPF is developing a partnership with the ASB 
Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins to provide training and support to participants in 
undertaking such analyses as part of their Readiness programs.  
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Glossary 
Accounting stance – the point of view from which costs and benefits are calculated. Typical 
accounting stances in the REDD debate are that of the country as a whole, those of individual 
groups within a country, that of the government, and that of the global community as a 
whole.  
Additionality – whether a program has an impact that would not have occurred in the absence 
of the program.  
Implementation cost – the cost directly involved in implementing the REDD program; that is, 
the cost of the actions needed to reduce deforestation or forest degradation. 
Leakage – the loss of forest and emission of greenhouse gases as a direct result of 
implementing a REDD program, which occurs in a different location than the REDD program 
itself. 
Opportunity cost – the cost of the foregone benefits from one activity when an alternative 
activity is undertaken. In the context of REDD, the cost of foregoing the benefits that 
deforestation would have generated, such as timber and crop production.  
Transaction cost – the cost of identifying the REDD program, negotiating the transaction, and 
verifying and certifying the emission reductions, so that the REDD payment can be executed 
and considered legitimate by the parties to the transaction and external parties, in particular 
the cost of monitoring, reporting and verifying the tons of emission reductions.  
 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
Ha hectare 
NTFP Non-timber forest product 
PES Payments for environmental services 
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Developing Countries 
tC Metric tonne of carbon (1tC = 3.67tCO2) 
tCO2 Metric tonne of carbon dioxide (1tCO2=1/3.67tC) 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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